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In Chaffin v. Brame,1 plaintiff's evidence tended to show that while
traveling at night he was partially blinded by the lights of an approach-
ing vehicle; that he reduced the speed of his automobile, and, upon
passing the approaching vehicle, observed defendant's truck parked on
the traveled portion of the highway; that plaintiff was unable to avoid
striking the truck. Defendant's motion for nonsuit, on the ground that
plaintiff's evidence showed contributory negligence as a matter of law,
was denied and an issue of contributory negligence was submitted to
the jury. The decision affirming the action of the superior court does
much to clarify the North Carolina rule of "outrunning headlights,"
apparently the source of some confusion in recent years.2
Chaffin v. Brame is the most recent of a number of cases that involve
an after-dark collision of an automobile with a parked vehicle or some
other stationary object.3 The rule of "outrunning headlights" appli-
1233 N. C. 377, 64 S. E. 2d 276 (1951).
Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377 (1949).
See Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948) ; Note, 29 N C. L. REv. 439, 443 (1951).
' The cases have developed along two "lines."
Those in which a nonsuit is proper: e.g., Marshall v. Southern Ry. Co., 233
N. C. 38, 62 S. E. 2d 489 (1950); Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d
419 (1950) ; Hollingsworth v. Grier, 231 N. C. 108, 55 S. E. 2d 806 (1950) (de-
murrer to complaint sustained) ; Wilson v. Central Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 551,
54 S. E. 2d 53 (1949) ; Brown v. W. B. & S. Bus Lines, 230 N. C. 493, 53 S. E.
2d 539 (1949) ; Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 52 S. E. 2d 355 (1949) ; Parkway Bus
Co. v. Coble Dairy Products, 229 N. C. 352, 49 S. E. 2d 523 (1948); Tyson v.
Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251. (1948) ; Riggs v. Gulf Oil Corp., 228 N. C.
774, 47 S. E. 2d 254 (1948) ; McKinnon v. Howard Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132,
44 S. E. 2d 735 (1947) ; Allen v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 223 N. C. 118, 25 S. E.
2d 388 (1943) ; Pike v. Seymour, 222 N. C. 42, 21 S. E. 2d 884 (1942) ; Sibbett
v. R. & W. Transit Co., 220 N. C. 702, 18 S. E. 2d 203 (1942) ; Beck v. Hooks,
218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. 2d 608 (1940); Lee v. Atlantic Coastline R. R., 212 N. C.
340, 193 S. E. 395 (1937) ; Weston v. Southern Ry., 194 N. C. 210, 139 S. E. 237
(1927).
Those in which submission of an issue of contributory negligence to the jury
is proper: e.g., Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377
(1949) ; Dawson v. Seashore Transportation Co., 230 N. C. 36, 51 S. E. 2d 921
(1949) ; Barlow v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1948) ; Cum-
mins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945); Clarke v.
Martin, 217 N. C. 440, 8 S. E. 2d 230 (1940) ; Leonard v. Tatum Transfer Co.,
218 N. C. 667, 12 S. E. 2d 729 (1940) ; Page v. McLamb, 215 N. C. 789, 3 S. E.
2d 275 (1939) ; Clarke v. Martin, 215 N. C. 405, 2 S. E. 2d 10 (1939) ; Cole v.
Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637 (1938) ; Lambert V. Caronna, 206 N. C. 616,
175 S. E. 303 (1934) ; Williams v. Frederickson Motor Lines, 198 N. C. 193, 151
S. E. 197 (1929).
All these cases involve collision with a stationary object. Collision with moving
object is not within the scope of this note. There is, however, in some of the
cases, a question of fact as to whether the vehicle was stopped or stopping.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
cable to these cases is usually stated as follows:
"... [A person driving at night] must operate his motor vehicle
in such manner and at such speed as will enable him to stop
within the radius of his lights." 4
The application of this standard arises where defendant moves for a
compulsory nonsuit predicated on the evidence showing contributory
negligence as a matter of law.5 Perhaps the principal obstacle to a clear
understanding of the rule is the terse statement generally accorded it.
This has tended to make it appear rigid, but in view of recent decisions, 6
this rigidity is only superficial.
Though several opinions are written in terms of each case being
decided on its own facts, 7 it is difficult to determine whether or not the
standard employed since 1927 has consistently been a flexible one of
due care. Careful study of the factual situation in each case seems to
support a conclusion that, although the statement of the rule has been
rigid, the rule as actually applied by the court has always been simply
a standard of due care.8
Whether this conclusion is accepted or not, there can be no doubt
'Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C. 155, 158, 52 S. E. 2d 355, 356 (1949), and cases there
cited.
' For usual rules as to granting of nonsuit on grounds of contributory negli-
gence, see Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209
(1944), and cases cited there.
The question may also arise at the pleading stage, where a demurrer is filed
on the ground that contributory negligence appears on thq face of the complaint.
Hollingsworth v. Grier, 231 N. C. 108, 55 S. E. 2d 806 (1950).
' "The law simply decrees that a person operating a motor vehicle at night
must so drive that he can stop his automobile or change its course in time to avoid
collision with any obstacle or obstruction whose presence on the highway is rea-
sonably perceivable to him or reasonably expectable by him. It certainly does not
require him to see that which is invisible to a person exercising ordinary care."
Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377, 380, 64 S. E. 2d 276, 279 (1951). ". . . the
bench and bar [have a tendency] to regard it [the rule] as a rule of thumb rather
than as an effort to express in a convenient formula for ready application to a
recurring factual situation, the basic principle that a person must exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury when he undertakes to drive a motor vehicle upon a public
highway at night." Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 132, 52 S. E.
2d 377, 383 (1949).
'Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, supra note 6; Dawson v. Seashore Trans-
portation Co., 230 N. C. 36, 51 S. E. 2d 921 (1949) ; Parkway Bus Co. v. Coble
Dairy Products, 229 N. C. 352, 49 S. E. 2d 623 (1948); McKinnon v. Howard
Motor Lines, 228 N. C. 132, 44 S. E. 2d 735 (1947) ; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188
S. E. 637 (1938).
' The only case that put a seemingly rigid rule squarely before the court in-
volved the following instruction, asked for by defendant and refused by the trial
court: "If you find . . . that the plaintiff ... could see only 10 or 15 feet in front
of his machine and that a much greater distance than 15 feet would be required to
stop his machine, then ... plaintiff would be guilty of negligence, and if, y9ou
further find ... that such negligence was either the proximate cause or one of the
proximate causes of plaintiff's injury, then ... plaintiff would be guilty of con-
tributory negligence... .' The court said the instruction or its substance, should
have been given. Clarke v. Martin, 217 N. C. 440, 441, 8 S. E. 2d 230 (1940).
It is noteworthy that in spite of this seeming approval of a rigid charge, there
vet remains elasticity in that portion of the charge dealing with proximate cause.
1951]"*
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as to the present status of the rule. It is one of due care under the
circumstances. The elements of "outrunning headlights," i.e., the speed
of the vehicle as related to the range of the headlights and the effective-
ness of the brake mechanism, are simply considered as relatively impor-
tant factors in determining the presence or absence of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. Since the bare fact of a collision would
in most cases give rise to an inference that plaintiff was "outrunning
his headlights," it seems that the only effective means of withstanding
a demurrer or nonsuit is a careful marshalling of facts that tend to show
extenuating circumstances in the particular case. 9 Facts having a bear-
ing of importance for this purpose have been indicated by a recent
note.' 0
A comparison with the status of the rule, or its equivalent, in other
jurisdictions" indicates that the North Carolina Supreme Court has
taken a sensible approach to a -difficult problem which is of importance
to many North Carolina motorists. In the light of recent decisions, the
following statement seems to be indicative of the court's attitude toward
'oti&unning headlights":
One must operate a motor vehicle at night in a manner that will
,enable him to avoid striking objects that, by the exercise of rea-
sonable care, he should perceive or anticipate as they come within
the range of the headlights of his vehicle.
JOHN R. MONTGOMERY, JR.
Bailments-Validity of Contract Limiting Liability for Negligence
Automobile owner contracted with defendant parking lot operator
for parking privileges,' the parties agreeing orally2 that defendant would
' The situation here is similar to the doctrine enunciated by the court that, the
failure of a motorist to stop at a point where a clear view may be had of railroad
tracks before crossing them is contributory negligence as a matter of law. Parker
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 232 N. C. 472, 61 S. E. 2d 370 (1950). It is interest-
ing to note that this doctrine appeared in North Carolina in 1927, the same year
as the rule of "outrunning headlights." Harrison v. North Carolina R. R., 194 N. C.
656, 140 S. E. 598 (1927). The rigid doctrine is generally considered to be the
result of Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927). But, by the
recognition of "modifying factors," the North Carolina Court has, for most pur-
poses, transformed the doctrine into a standard of reasonable care. See Note, 29
N. C. L. REv. 301 (1951).
"Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 153 (1948).
"See cases cited in 58 A. L. R. 1493 (1929), 87 A. L. R. 900 (1933), 97 A. L. R.
546 (1944). In many states the rule is codified in "assured clear distance" statutes.
See Rich v. Petersen Truck Lines, 357 Pa. 318, 53 A. 2d 725 (1947) ; Smiley v.
Arrow Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N. E. 2d 3 (1941). For an extensive
discussion of the effects of the rule of "outrunning headlights," with citations to
cases from many jurisdictions, see Comment, 34 ILL. L. REV. 65 (1940).
'The car keys were turned over to defendant so that he might move it about
the lot as necessity demanded. Distinguish from instances where the owner keeps
the car keys and is merely lessee of his parking spot. In such case there is no
[Vol. 30
